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Treasury Center as Profit Center

The silver lining in the new scrutiny of global transfer pricing is that treasury might finally escape from its cost center box.

The context here is the mess treasury is going to face with tax, cleaning up after the OECD BEPS Actions. The silver lining is that the new scrutiny of global transfer pricing might serve as justification for treasury to become a profit center, or at least set up treasury centers and in-house banks that get better compensated based on arm’s-length pricing for services rendered. Few external banks are offering a treasury services where they don’t earn a profit, unless the services are part of an overall “wallet” that is profitable–so why should an in-house bank not be generating profit when providing treasury services for group affiliates?

The silver lining in the new scrutiny of global transfer pricing is that treasury might finally escape from its cost center box.

(Editor’s Note—Original publication date: March 17, 2015)

The context here is the mess treasury faces with tax, cleaning up after the OECD BEPS Actions. The silver lining is that the new scrutiny of global transfer pricing might serve as justification for treasury to become a profit center, or at least set up treasury centers and in-house banks that get better compensated based on arm’s-length pricing for services rendered. Few external banks are offering a treasury services where they don’t earn a profit, unless the services are part of an overall “wallet” that is profitable–so why should an in-house bank not be generating profit when providing treasury services for group affiliates?

Arm’s length = profit
To say that an arm’s-length price must have a profit margin in it, may be simplifying things a bit, but it helps get to the argument that treasurers should be overseeing profit centers in response to growing scrutiny on transfer pricing. They should make this argument because it helps them with the biggest issue they face: being starved for resources despite the huge value-added role treasury plays, because they have only relatively soft performance metrics to point to (compared to profits) when asked to cut costs.

Here is just one service where arm’s length pricing should generate a profit for treasury:

Centralized exposure management for affiliates. Paragraph 69 of the OECD Discussion Draft on BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10 (on revisions to Chapter 1 of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines, including risk, recharacterisation and special measures) lays out the logic [bold is our emphasis]:

“Often a MNE group will centralise treasury functions with the result that the implementation of risk mitigation strategies relating to interest rate and currency risks are performed centrally in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness. It may be the case that the operating company reports in accordance with group policy a currency exposure, and the centralised treasury function organises a financial instrument that the operating company enters into. As a result, the centralised function can be seen as providing a service to the operating company, for which it should receive compensation on arm’s length terms. More difficult transfer pricing issues may arise, however, if the financial instrument is entered into by the centralised function or another group company, with the result that the positions are not matched within the same company, although the group position is protected. In such a case, an analysis of the conduct of the parties may suggest that the treasury function is not entering into speculative arrangements on its own account, but is taking steps to hedge the specific exposure of the operating company and has entered into the instrument essentially on behalf of the operating subsidiary. As a consequence the treasury company provides a service…”

Risk is an important component of proposed transfer pricing revisions, since the entity that assumes the risk (as does the entity that receives capital) should have a capability to add value with it (a new take on substance). This gets to transfer pricing rewarding the entity with the capability, not just one contracted to assume risk (or capital). [Note: There will be a public consultation on these transfer pricing matters on March 19-20 at the OECD Conference Centre in Paris.]

Treasury is often the function with the most capability to manage financial risk and thus arm’s-length transfer pricing should reward treasury for the services it provides in managing it, especially when it involves risk transfer between affiliates, but even risk management done on their behalf.

High value vs. low value-adding services
In contrast to high value-adding risk management activities, there are low value-adding services that require arm’s length transfer pricing: Enough to reflect the service rendered, but not so much to shift profits unfairly by charging well in excess of their value add. The discussion draft for BEPS Action 10 (on Proposed Modifications to Chapter VII of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines Related to Low Value-Adding Intra-Group Services) suggests that financial transactions would fall outside the definition of low value-adding services, which may have transfer pricing determined on a more simplified cost-center basis.

However, one comment letter from bMoxie, a boutique Belgian professional services firm specializing in tax and transfer pricing, notes that financial transactions can be wide ranging, and thus not all treasury services would be high value:

“It is unclear what is meant with financial transactions. We tend to strictly define this is as the exchange of (financial) assets, and accordingly not be as broad as the full spectrum of financial services or services that relate to the financial position of companies. Indeed many multinational groups organize their financial services or treasury departments centrally to enable an efficient and effective service to the group members, which may include the execution of financial transactions, but also certain financial services. These services in turn may be fitting or not fitting the definition of low value-adding services. It is not uncommon that group treasury centers also provide auxiliary services that fit the examples of what is provided in paragraph 7.48 – i.e. that are merely of an accounting or administrative nature, and that do entail processing and managing of accounts receivable and account payable. In other words, the scope of a treasury department typically includes investment and funding activities, and may include other financial services that do require the assumption or control of substantial or significant risk, but may very well include services that could be considered low value-adding services, in the view of bMoxie.

Taking it one step further, even for instance in the light of a cash pool, that entails the exchange of assets, it may well be that the cash pool manager is only to be considered economically to be performing a pure clerical function when it contractually vis-à-vis the cash pool bank and the participants does not assume any risk, however in practice this would not unlikely be the case that the cash pool manager. We just wanted to make the point that even in the light of services auxiliary to financial transactions, there may be a certain division of activities amongst stakeholders that could lead one of the service providers rendering services that could technically qualify as low value-adding services.”

This sort of thinking will not get treasury out of its cost center box. It may also warrant more careful consideration going forward of what activities get put in a treasury center or in-house bank (e.g., payment and collection activities) vs. a shared services center, merely to keep the transfer pricing categorizations clean and the treasury-as-profit-center silver lining intact.

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Checklist: What You Should Know About ISDAs

Understanding the standard document used to govern over-the-counter derivatives transactions.

Based on many discussions with practitioners in The NeuGroups’s peer groups here is a checklist of things to consider when implementing ISDAs.

One of the first considerations is whether it is worth bothering to set up an ISDA with every counterparty.

Understanding the standard document used to govern over-the-counter derivatives transactions.

Based on many discussions with practitioners in NeuGroup peer groups, here is a checklist of things to consider when implementing ISDA Master Agreements (ISDAs).

One of the first considerations is whether it is worth bothering to set up an ISDA with every counterparty.

  • Only value-add banks, please. With limited trading capacity to spread around—as well as treasury bandwidth—practitioners agreed that firms should focus on the banks that are able to add real value from an dealer standpoint. If they don’t, why waste time and energy on negotiating an ISDA?
  • Invest in a good ISDA template. Many treasurers also agreed that it is worth the money to pay a specialist attorney to create an ISDA template. This could be used as a starting point for negotiations with counterparties (or ending point, if firms are prepared to walk away if a bank does not accept the basic tenets of the template agreement).

Consensus has it that a template should be doable for anywhere from $50-100K in legal fees (fees should be coming down as more corporates turn to ISDAs and the more corporate-oriented clauses become part of law firms starter templates).

The need to involve internal counsel to cross-check these templates might raise the legal costs. Finally, while the first instinct might be to limit the ISDA to FX, it usually is more effective to consider the broader counterparty risk across asset classes, when preparing the template.

  • Choose your vintage. It pays to keep track of what the major differences are between the different “vintages” of ISDA templates (in practice, 1992 or 2002; see sidebar below), and be prepared to argue for the “preferred” one. Several members have mentioned how hard it is these days to have all their banks of the same vintage but that they have still been reasonably successful.

“We try to keep them standard,” said a treasury head whose company is “99 percent” on 2002 ISDAs; another has managed to keep all its banks to 1992 ISDAs. Marc A. Horwitz, an attorney formerly with Baker McKenzie (now with DLA Piper), noted: “For end users (corporates), we prefer 1992, particularly for FX trading.”

  • Banks are different. Each bank has a different risk tolerance and will focus on different areas, such as the definition of early termination, settlement, or credit committee concerns. Overall, members agree that non-US banks are harder than US banks, and Japanese banks, for example, are very conservative.
  • Don’t hesitate to stick to your guns. Treasury should not be afraid to play hardball with banks when negotiating their ISDAs, or if they are up for renewal. One way is the template approach; another is to flag the clauses that are a source for concern and stand firm regarding those. Check with senior management of course, but if you don’t like the terms a bank is offering, be prepared to say “no thanks” and walk away.

Also, just as banks have their pet peeves about what they consider important aspects of the ISDA to protect themselves, in the end, said one FX risk director, “you have to carve out various aspects of the [ISDA] contract you don’t like.”

  • Beware multiple-branch clauses. When specifying entities covered by the ISDA in the “schedule,” it is also important to be clear on the language on multiple branches, as this can help determine whether it’s better to book trades, for example, with the local Citi branch or Citi New York. One FX director noted that no matter which branch executes his company’s deals they are always “booked” with the London entity of the trading bank. One of his peers in the NeuGroup’s European Treasurers’ Peer Group (EuroTPG) agreed: “We insist on dealing with the main bank or branch, nobody else.”

Whether pricing is influenced by where the trade is executed is something to watch out for. A firm in the large-cap bracket with a bank in one region of the world may be covered by the medium-cap group in another, due to the relative size of its presence there. This could be true for one or several banks.

Banks should also not be allowed to book trades from branches located in jurisdictions which prohibit offshore FX transactions unless the ISDA is in the name of the onshore sub.

OTHER CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

  • Cross-default thresholds. A cross-default provision (under which all outstanding trades covered by the ISDA can be terminated if the counterparty defaults on third-party debt) can be elected in the ISDA schedule, but firms should consider whether to have it. When opting for the provision, it is important to set a threshold amount such that a cross default is not triggered unnecessarily by technical but not material events, and is not lower than existing credit agreements’ cross-default thresholds.
  • Termination settlements. In the 1992 ISDA form (see below), there are two methods for calculating an early termination settlement (triggered by “default” and “termination” events defined in the contract):

1) “Loss” (or “unpaid amounts”); and

2) “Market quotation.”

The former considers the amount that would make the counterparty whole on the trade. The latter requires four market quotes and the ultimate price is the average of the two middle quotes.

“Some corporates take strong views on which they prefer,” noted Mr. Horwitz, based on their experience with closeouts or what types of trade they plan to use most.

Market quotes work well for vanilla trades because it’s considered likely the trades will be priced fairly. The “loss” method works better for highly structured trades.

  • Confirmation supersedes ISDA. After a few corporate derivatives debacles in the 1990s, banks favor inserting a “non-reliance clause” into the 1992 ISDA (it is in the pre-printed 2002 form) in which the bank basically says “you (the company) know what you’re doing, so we’re not responsible.”

Very few corporates manage to negotiate out of the non-reliance clause. Because trade confirmations supersede ISDAs, those that don’t have the clause should take extra care that the clause does not get reinserted into the trade confirmations.

On the other hand (and this is another “score” for SWIFT), a corporate practitioner pointed out that using SWIFT confirmations helps in this regard as there is “not much room for sticking in additional terms or changes.”

THE TABLES ARE TURNED

While ISDAs may have been insisted on by banks in the past, it is now corporates that are scrutinizing them to ensure they are properly protected when banks look vulnerable. Firms, therefore, should take extra precautions to guard against events that may work against them at some future point in a trading relationship, when banks again look less vulnerable, starting with a mutually agreeable ISDA.

WINE AND ISDAS: VINTAGE MATTERS
Should a firm opt for the 1992 or 2002 form of ISDA? The major differences between the two, said Baker McKenzie (now DLA Piper) attorney Marc. A. Horwitz, are:

Grace period for failure to pay. The grace period in the 1992 form is three business days, in the 2002, only one. For treasuries with limited bandwidth, three days’ grace can prevent mistakes and non-payments not due to credit default events from unduly punishing the firm or result in terminated trades.

Scope. The 2002 form includes a broader range of specified transactions, such as repos, reverse repos and securities loans. “For corporates, we generally prefer 1992; you don’t want an unexpected event in a non-ISDA trade to permit the bank to unwind this ISDA trade,” Mr. Horwitz said.

Force majeure. The 2002 form has a force majeure clause which governs termination of trades that are impossible to make payments on, after an eight business-day waiting period.

Right of set-off. The pre-printed 2002 form includes a set-off provision, which the 1992 form does not (it can be inserted).

Settlement. The 1992 form permits “loss” or “market quotation” as basis for the settlement price upon early termination. The 2002 form has a pre-determined method, a “hybrid” between the two, which doesn’t require four market quotes. There have been efforts within ISDA to migrate end users to the close-out amount, and while firms on the 1992 form can opt for this protocol, it “hasn’t taken that well with corporates,” Mr. Horwitz noted.

ELECTIVE EARLY TERMINATION
As counterparty risk concerns remain pronounced both on the corporate and the bank side, corporates are reporting that banks are showing increasing interest in inserting an elective-termination clause into the ISDA (in the Other Provisions section).

For example, one bank has requested to insert it into a 1992 ISDA master with a corporate, which would allow either side to terminate a derivative six months after inception, and every six months thereafter.

The concern with such a clause is that the company is at risk of the bank terminating a long-term hedge by invoking this clause, leaving the company unhedged. This could cause unintended cash-flow consequences and, more importantly, problems with the hedge qualifying for hedge accounting treatment even at inception.

While the ISDA forms have specified “default” and “termination” events that are standard and bilateral, elective early termination clauses are not common, nor are they recommended in an ISDA governing a relationship, and that may cover a multitude of trades over a long period of time. Former Baker McKenzie (now DLA Piper) ISDA attorney Marc A. Horwitz pointed out that, absent a compelling regulatory or credit reason for such a clause, corporates should push back on banks trying to insert it.

A hedge, after all, is for protecting the corporation, not the bank, as a risk manager pointed out, and corporates already have a way to get out of hedges: by unwinding them; this, however, should be the firm’s decision, not the bank’s.

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Crossborder Pooling: Notional vs. ZBA

For many MNCs, an emphasis on effective management of working capital has translated into renewed urgency in rationalizing liquidity structures.

The tight credit market—combined with general economic weakness—has forced a strong focus on cash and liquidity management for both cash-rich and cash-poor companies.

As the ability to generate cash (or borrow it) has declined, MNCs report an increased need to have a clear view of their cash position globally. Visibility, however, is not enough. Treasurers also need effective techniques and procedures to manage their global liquidity. That task increases in complexity as a result of geographical spread, multiplicity of banking relationships, cross-currency flows and corporate structure issues (e.g., tax).

For many MNCs, an emphasis on effective management of working capital has translated into renewed urgency in rationalizing liquidity structures.

(Editor’s Note—Original publication date: June 16, 2003)

The tight credit market—combined with general economic weakness—has forced a strong focus on cash and liquidity management for both cash-rich and cash-poor companies.

As the ability to generate cash (or borrow it) has declined, MNCs report an increased need to have a clear view of their cash position globally. Visibility, however, is not enough. Treasurers also need effective techniques and procedures to manage their global liquidity. That task increases in complexity as a result of geographical spread, multiplicity of banking relationships, cross-currency flows and corporate structure issues (e.g., tax).

A consolidated view of cash

One of the most useful liquidity-management tools in the treasury toolbox is cash “pooling,” an arrangement whereby the credit/debit positions of different accounts are viewed from a single summary perspective.

This approach gives treasurers a chance to view cash on a regional and global basis, at the same time allowing affiliates to utilize their collective liquidity more effectively (i.e., instead of one subsidiary borrowing while the other is flush with cash).

Companies planning to centralize cash for multiple international subsidiaries have two basic options available:

• Zero balance accounts (ZBAs); or

• Notional cash pooling.

While both achieve the same ultimate objective, there are technical differences, which can then have significant organizational and tax consequences to either approach.

Zero-balance accounts (ZBAs)

ZBAs refer to linked accounts at the same bank and in the same currency and country. Funds are physically transferred in/out (zero-balanced) from subaccounts to a main account daily.

ZBAs: Key Aspects

The following are the key characteristics of a ZBA pooling arrangement:

• Same bank/same branch

• Same country

• Same currency

• Segregation of subaccounts which are then linked to a main account

• Completely automatic (bank), no manual transfers required

• Intercompany lending arrangements if separate legal entities participate, which means an arm’s-length interest rate must be assessed.

This primary account is usually held in the name of the Corporate Parent, Country or Area Headquarters/Holding Company or a Regional Treasury Center, such as a BCC, IFSC or OHQ.

If the subaccount holders are divisions of the same legal entity (such as branches, sales offices or plants), there are no tax issues. Indeed, often companies use ZBAs as a simple method to segregate different types of activities, such as receipts and disbursements, even if there is no regional or organizational segregation already in place.

However, if the subaccount holders are separate legal entities (i.e., subsidiaries), the funds movement into the main account constitutes an intercompany loan from the subsidiary to the main account holder and vice versa; this, in turn, generates some tax and accounting issues.

Audit trail and accounting. For example, documentation must be maintained for audit trail purposes and the main account holder (e.g., central treasury) must charge an “arm’s length” interest rate to the participating subsidiaries. Although banks provide separate statements for each subaccount, they will not typically do the accounting, manage the loan portfolio or assess/pay interest. (Some banks do run separate businesses which provide these services on an outsourced basis, usually out of Dublin.)

So unless this aspect of recordkeeping etc. is handled by a bank or third-party outsourced service, it must be done internally. Many treasury workstations and ERPs provide intracompany loan-management functionality as part of their core offerings. If the activity is at all substantial, spreadsheet solutions may not be sufficient (and certainly won’t provide the layer of automation of both interest allocation/payment and reporting that makes this cost effective).

Cost benefits. In-country ZBA arrangements are very common and have been a staple of managing US cash for years. Yet they are not universally possible. In certain countries, such as Korea, ZBAs may not be permissible at all, and in countries where there is an assessment of debit tax on transactions out of a bank account, such as Australia, a ZBA arrangement may end up being not cost effective.

For treasurers managing subsidiaries in multiple countries/currencies, the ZBA structure can be set up as an overlay, but funds must first be physically transferred from country A, B or C to the concentration location.

Two-tier approach. Often there is a daily pooling/ZBA in the originating country first, and then a sweep or manual transfer to the location of the main account, with less frequency. Thus the cross-border ZBA is usually a two-tiered structure. Weekly transfers are fairly standard. Daily transfers cannot be cost justified except with the very largest multinationals.

Therefore, in assessing the efficacy of overlay ZBA arrangements, a cost/benefit analysis is essential to establish the target level of cash required at the local level, and the frequency of transfer to the main account. Also overlay options may require opening additional in-country accounts, which can get expensive.

But perhaps the main drawback or limitation of ZBAs is that they’re only available on a single-currency basis. Thus, at the treasury level, there must be a main account for each separate currency.

Notional cash pooling

That’s where notional cash pooling enters the picture. With notional pooling, there is no physical movement of funds between accounts; rather, credit and debit interest are offset. Interest is paid/charged on the net balance position, but the legal/tax separation of separate subsidiaries owned by the same parent is maintained.

The initial (or direct) benefits of pooling come from the reduction of overdraft interest expense by centralizing the company’s liquidity position (see example in table below).

Legal hurdles. Notional pooling is great in theory. In practice, however, this pooling arrangement is not permitted in all countries. In these countries ZBA arrangements are used.

The big benefit to this arrangement, however, in the countries where it is most common, such as the UK, Netherlands and Belgium, is that there’s minimal or no withholding tax on interest earned. Often, too, (unlike physical pooling/ZBA arrangements) it’s not necessary to have a main or header account; the offset is simply among the participants. However, some countries (such as France) do require that there is a holding company in place.

The key advantage of notional pooling is that it allows for a multicurrency view of cash.

Notional: Key Aspects

The following are the key characteristics of a notional pooling arrangement:

• Same bank/ different branches

• Same country is most common

• Multicurrency pooling is extremely sensitive from a tax and accounting perspective—Spain can’t participate, for example due to local tax regulations

• Cross guarantees are required by the bank, regardless of the cash position of the participants

• Interest actually charged/paid to participants is optional—but may be advisable from a tax perspective.

However, in order to pay/charge interest on a single consolidated basis, the bank will use an interest rate differential to avoid currency conversion, similar to how a short-dated swap is handled. From a company’s perspective, this may ultimately affect the cost effectiveness of the arrangement. The company typically ends up paying forward points, thus reducing the interest-rate earned for a positive consolidated balance.

There is also a risk factor involved, as treasury is actually outsourcing this activity (to a bank). This means treasury may lose some control over the counterparties involved in the transaction.

Virtual pooling. In reality (or in virtual reality), treasury can achieve similar effects by using internal systems to execute the loans or interest offsets, and then generating the appropriate entries into the accounting system (i.e., an in-house bank). Also the rates achieved for investing excess cash would be higher. In fact, although a few large banks do offer multicurrency pooling, they are not entirely comfortable with it. (One of the very large banks simply decided not to offer notional pooling, only ZBAs are used; notional pooling was too fraught with difficulties).

In all cases, however, the bank will not act as a tax advisor, will insist on a sign-off from the company’s tax counsel and require cross guarantees between the participants. (That’s a hurdle for many MNCs.)

Loan by every other name. Pooling ostensibly gets around the issue of putting intercompany loans into place, because it is notional. However, it is a variant of a short-term intercompany loan arrangement, allowing a bank service to handle the periodic cash-reserve ups and downs of different entities.

If there were a permanent or long-term mismatch in liquidity, companies would more effectively use intercompany loans as the mechanisms. That’s why tax authorities will look carefully at pooling arrangements, and still may require some type of arm’s length interest depending on the amount and tenor of the offsets.

Also, if the company is always in an excess cash position, the concept of a notional offset makes no sense. And using a notional multicurrency pool as an investment vehicle is counterproductive, as the interest rate paid on the pool will be far lower than what individual currency pools will be able to achieve.

As a treasury management technique, cross border pooling is primarily used in Europe and to a more limited extent on Asia, where there are still regulatory issues that limit the participation of certain countries.

It is not used at all in Latin America (regionally) where there are significant regulatory issues and withholding tax restrictions on intercompany lending. Thus, the essential first step in evaluating any cross-border pooling arrangements is to focus on the management structure of the company and what tax implications may arise.

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